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ON THE ROAD TO VICTORY IN AMERICA‘S WAR ON 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: LANDMARKS, LANDMINES, 
AND THE NEED FOR CENTRALIZED STRATEGY 
America is at war. Declared by the Clinton Administration in the 
late 1990s, then prioritized by the Bush Administration, the ―war‖ on 
human trafficking represents America‘s struggle to eradicate the 
phenomenon of modern-day slavery within its borders.1 An army of 
legislators, law enforcement agents, and everyday abolitionists fight on 
legal, social, and political battlefields to liberate the hidden victims who 
suffer in bondage. The recent enactment of the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 20082 (―2008 
TVPRA‖), heralds significant victories in the battles to achieve better 
victim protection and increase prosecution of traffickers. But even as 
legislative battles are conquered, others continue to develop. The war 
suffers from incohesiveness, a lack of direction, and political discord. 
These problems point to a missing tactical element that is critical to the 
war‘s ultimate success—a strategic framework that is both centralized 
and comprehensive. This Note proposes that publication of an annual 
United States Trafficking in Persons Strategy (―U.S. TIPS‖), aptly 
directed by the nation‘s Commander-in-Chief, could help solve these 
problems by establishing a well-defined mission, uniting all ―soldiers‖ 
under a common purpose, and providing a means by which to measure 
progress toward a specified timeline of goals. In 2009, the task falls on 
the Obama Administration to pick up the war on trafficking where his 
predecessors left off: our newest President must provide the leadership 
necessary to rally the troops, cast a vision, and finish the fight.  
This Note tracks the development of the war on human trafficking 
in America through the 2008 TVPRA and identifies emerging red flags 
that signal the need for a strategic framework. Part I explains the 
nature of human trafficking as a criminal enterprise and the context of 
                                                 
1  Human trafficking is a crisis that rages in countries throughout the world. In its 
broadest sense, the ―war‖ on human trafficking, exists at a global level, but it can be 
dissected and evaluated on regional, national, or even state levels. Though much 
scholarship is dedicated to assessment of the war on human trafficking at the global level, 
the scope of this Note encompasses only the legal efforts to address human trafficking 
within American borders.  
2  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, tits. I–III, 122 Stat. 5044, 5044–87 (to be codified in scattered sections 
of 6, 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ457.110.pdf. The bill passed in 
the House and Senate on December 10, 2008, and President George W. Bush signed it into 
law on December 23, 2008. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR07311:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited May 10, 2009) (providing 
legislative history) [hereinafter TVPRA of 2008 Legislative History]. 
Published in Regent University Law Review, vol. 21 (2009), pp. 161-193.
Copyright © 2009 Regent University Law Review. Used by permission.
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/studentorgs/lawreview/home.cfm
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America‘s first anti-trafficking legislation, the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 20003 (―TVPA‖). Part II addresses some of the 
critiques, obstacles, and pitfalls experienced in the early years of the 
TVPA‘s implementation. Part III acknowledges the impressive 
legislative strides that mended gaps identified in earlier legislation, 
focusing largely on the 2008 TVPRA amendments. Part IV illuminates 
the need for a strategic framework by addressing several potential 
landmines in the political battleground, where ongoing debate over the 
scope of trafficking, the effect of prostitution, and the role of competing 
agencies threatens to impede anti-trafficking efforts. Part V proposes an 
annually published U.S. TIPS as a means for the President to implement 
a centralized and comprehensive strategic framework that would define 
the parameters of human trafficking; establish the roles of concerned 
departments, agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (―NGOs‖); 
position future goals in an aspirational timeline; measure progress on a 
state-by-state and national basis; and provide a centrally recognized 
document to report synthesized updates of ongoing research results. 
I. HOW IT ALL BEGAN: THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING BATTLEGROUND IN 
AMERICAN BACKYARDS AND THE ENACTMENT OF THE TVPA 
Despite increasing awareness about human trafficking, many—if 
not most—Americans would be shocked to know that slavery still exists, 
even in their own backyard. Known today as human trafficking, this 
phenomenon has become a ―criminal enterprise involving both local 
scoundrels and sophisticated international syndicates‖ that generates 
billions of dollars each year.4 Notably, ―human trafficking is tied with the 
illegal arms industry as the second largest criminal industry in the 
world today [after drug dealing], and it is the fastest growing.‖5 Under 
                                                 
3  Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
div. A, 114 Stat. 1464, 1464–91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 
U.S.C.). 
4  DAVID BATSTONE, NOT FOR SALE: THE RETURN OF THE GLOBAL SLAVE TRADE—
AND HOW WE CAN FIGHT IT 5 (2007). Some debate exists over the economic magnitude of 
the enterprise: ―The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) projects that the slave trade 
generates $9.5 billion in revenue each year.‖ Id. at 3–4 (citing U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 14 (2004) [hereinafter TIP REPORT 2004], available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34158.pdf). ―The International Labour Office 
(ILO) estimates that figure to be closer to a whopping $32 billion annually.‖ Id. at 4 (citing 
INT‘L LABOUR OFFICE, A GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST FORCED LABOUR: GLOBAL REPORT 
UNDER THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RIGHTS AT WORK 2005, at 55 (2005), available at http://www.diversite.be/diversiteit/files/ 
File/MH_TEH/documentatie/DECLARATIONWEB.pdf).  
5  ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACT 
SHEET: HUMAN TRAFFICKING, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/trafficking/about/fact_human.html 
(last visited May 10, 2009); see also TVPA, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(8) (2006) (―Trafficking in 
persons is increasingly perpetrated by organized, sophisticated criminal enterprises. . . . 
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this modern day form of slavery, humans (predominantly women and 
children6) are lured by false promises of valid employment, traded and 
sold like commodities, and then forced into labor or sexually exploited.7  
Recognizing the danger of this growing criminal enterprise, 
President Clinton issued a directive in March 1998 that formally 
condemned trafficking in women and girls as a ―fundamental human 
rights violation.‖8 The directive established the familiar ―3-P‖ 
prerogative—―a U.S. government-wide anti-trafficking strategy of (1) 
prevention, (2) protection and support for victims, and (3) prosecution of 
traffickers.‖9 In effect, the directive also served as the initial battle cry 
that declared America‘s war on human trafficking. 
The Clinton Administration‘s call for prosecution of traffickers led 
to the swift enactment of the TVPA,10 a landmark federal act that 
enjoyed overwhelming bipartisan support11 as the first set of laws to 
criminalize sex and labor trafficking in America.12 The TVPA not only 
                                                                                                                  
Profits from the trafficking industry contribute to the expansion of organized crime in the 
United States and worldwide. Trafficking in persons is often aided by official corruption in 
countries of origin, transit, and destination, thereby threatening the rule of law.‖). 
6  The 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report, an annual authority published by the 
U.S. Department of State that monitors human trafficking worldwide, estimates that ―80 
percent of transnational victims are women and girls and up to 50 percent are minors.‖ 
U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2008) [hereinafter TIP REPORT 
2008], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105501.pdf. These figures 
―do not include [the] millions . . . trafficked within their own national borders.‖ Id.  
7  TVPA, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(2)–(3).  
Traffickers lure women and girls into their networks through false promises of 
decent working conditions at relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, 
factory workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models. Traffickers also 
buy children from poor families and sell them into prostitution or into various 
types of forced or bonded labor.  
Id. § 7101(b)(4). 
8  Memorandum on Steps to Combat Violence Against Women and Trafficking in 
Women and Girls, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 412, 412 (Mar. 11, 1998) [hereinafter 
Clinton Memorandum]. 
9  CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & ALISON SISKIN, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: U.S. POLICY 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 38 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code 
RL 34317, Aug. 14 2008) [hereinafter CRS Report], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/RL34317.pdf; Clinton Memorandum, supra note 8, at 412–13. 
10  Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
div. A, 114 Stat. 1464, 1464–91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 
U.S.C.). 
11  ―On October 6, 2000, the report resoundingly passed in the House by a vote of 
371 to 1, despite the fact that it had been packaged with some unrelated measures that 
members found annoying. On October 11, the Senate voted 95 to 0 to . . . approv[e] the 
trafficking bill.‖ ANTHONY M. DESTEFANO, THE WAR ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: U.S. POLICY 
ASSESSED 44 (2007).  
12  The TVPA enacted four new crimes specifically related to human trafficking: 
forced labor; trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced 
labor; sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud or coercion; and unlawful conduct with 
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provided the ammunition the United States Department of Justice 
(―DOJ‖) needed to prosecute human trafficking cases,13 it answered the 
President‘s call for victim protection by providing much needed 
assistance and immigration benefits such as the T visa.14 
Groundbreaking in its comprehensive tri-fold purpose of prosecution, 
protection, and prevention,15 the TVPA set a firm national tone of 
intolerance for the crime of human trafficking and quickly became a 
model for other nations and states to follow. 
The bad news? Countless instances of slavery still occur each day in 
America, often hidden in plain sight.16 Though numbers are difficult to 
                                                                                                                  
respect to documents in furtherance of trafficking, peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, 
or forced labor. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 sec. 112, 
§§ 1589–1592, 114 Stat. at 1486–88 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1592 
(2006)). The Act also established a mandatory restitution provision. Id. sec. 112, § 1593, 
114 Stat. at 1488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2006)).  
13  Until this bill was signed into effect by President Clinton on October 28, 2000, 
federal convictions of this unique and heinous crime were difficult to prosecute to an 
appropriate level of punishment because ―trafficking as a particular immigration crime 
was not defined or penalized as a separate offense,‖ and U.S. peonage laws from the 1880s 
were the closest analogous laws on the books. See DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at xvi, xix.  
14  See generally Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 sec. 107, 
114 Stat. at 1474–80 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (2006)) (titled ―Protection 
and Assistance for Victims of Trafficking‖). Notably, the TVPA granted victims of severe 
forms of trafficking federal and state benefits ―to the same extent as . . . a refugee‖ under 
immigration law. Id. sec.107(b)(1)(A) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(A)). 
These benefits were to be extended ―without regard to the immigration status of such 
victims.‖ Id. sec. 107(b)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(B)). The TVPA 
also bestowed certain protections for victims in government custody concerning adequate 
facilities, safety, access to medical care, and information regarding their legal rights. Id. 
sec. 107(c)(1) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(1)). As discussed further in Parts 
II and III, the TVPA created the T visa category, which granted important immigration 
benefits to certain victims by granting temporary legal status to remain in the United 
States, thus protecting them from removal proceedings. Id. sec.107(e)(1) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006)); see infra Parts II, III. Most of these benefits are 
predicated upon certification that the victim suffers or suffered from ―a severe form of 
trafficking in persons, as defined in section 103[(8)].‖ Id. sec. 107(e)(1)(C) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)).  
15  22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (―The purposes of this chapter are to combat trafficking in 
persons, . . . to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their 
victims.‖). 
16  ―That‘s the paradox: slavery is in reality not invisible. Except in rare 
circumstances, slaves toil in the public eye. The truth is we do not expect to find it in 
‗respectable‘ settings.‖ BATSTONE, supra note 4, at 7. At any given time, ―20, or 50, or 100 
victims could be locked behind the walls of an otherwise nondescript building, working for 
pennies and hoping for freedom—any kind of relief from their hard, forced labor.‖ Alberto 
R. Gonzales, U.S. Att‘y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the 2006 National Conference on 
Human Trafficking (Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/ 
2006/ag_speech_061003.html.  
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calculate,17 the U.S. government initially projected that of the estimated 
millions of persons trafficked worldwide for labor or sexual services,18 
about 50,000 crossed into the United States each year.19 The 
circumstances surrounding these victims are varied—some are 
psychologically bound to pimps, some are physically forced into cheap 
manual labor, and some are threatened into domestic servitude.20 But all 
victims share this in common: their profiting traffickers are desperate to 
keep their real stories hidden and employ coercive means to do so.21 To 
further complicate the problem, many local law enforcement and 
immigration officials do not yet possess the training to recognize a victim 
of human trafficking when they encounter one.22 All too frequently, 
victims are convicted of crimes associated with trafficking rather than 
the actual culprits—the traffickers themselves.23  
                                                 
17  The DOJ has acknowledged that ―[t]he difficulty of developing accurate estimates 
reflects the challenges of quantifying the extent of victimization in a crime whose 
perpetrators go to great lengths to keep it hidden and whose victims are reluctant to self-
identify for fear of being treated as criminals or illegal aliens . . . .‖ U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 29 
(2008) [hereinafter AG ANN. REP.], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ 
tr2007/agreporthumantrafficing2007.pdf.  
18  ―A wide range of estimates exists on the scope and magnitude of modern-day 
slavery‖—ranging ―from 4 million to 27 million‖ at any given time. TIP REPORT 2008, supra 
note 6, at 7.  
19  As of 2004, the government reduced this estimate to 14,500 to 17,500 per year, 
while admitting that an accurate estimate is nearly impossible to obtain due to the hidden 
nature of the crime. TIP REPORT 2004, supra note 4, at 23. For a fuller discussion of 
statistics on the scope of trafficking in the United States and their potential for inaccuracy, 
see infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
20  A concurrent House Resolution on March 27, 2007, ―[s]upporting the goals and 
ideals of observing the National Day of Human Trafficking Awareness each year‖ 
acknowledged that 
human traffickers use many physical and psychological techniques to control 
their victims, including the use of violence or threats of violence against the 
victim or the victim‘s family, isolation from the public, isolation from the 
victim‘s family and religious or ethnic communities, language and cultural 
barriers, shame, control of the victim‘s possessions, confiscation of passports 
and other identification documents, and threats of arrest, deportation, or 
imprisonment if the victim attempts to reach out for assistance or leave. 
H.R. Con. Res. 102, 110th Cong. (2007).  
21  See TIP REPORT 2008, supra note 6, at 7. ―The common denominator of trafficking 
scenarios is the use of force, fraud, or coercion to exploit a person for profit. . . . The use of 
force or coercion can be direct and violent or psychological.‖ Id. 
22  See infra Part II.A.1. 
23  See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(17) (2006). ―Existing laws often fail to protect victims of 
trafficking, and because victims are often illegal immigrants in the destination country, 
they are repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers themselves.‖ Id; see also 
DONNA M. HUGHES, FACT SHEET: DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 3–4 (2005), available at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/ 
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Though human trafficking continues to grow and remains hard to 
detect, Americans are organizing to fight against it. Under the 
leadership of President George W. Bush, human trafficking initiatives 
were labeled a serious legal issue meriting high priority.24 Since 2000, 
Congress has amended and reauthorized the TVPA three times,25 and 
most states have followed suit by initiating or enacting their own anti-
trafficking legislation.26 With unequivocal support from the President, 
Congress, a plethora of federal agencies, a growing number of states, and 
many impassioned NGOs that mobilized to support victims and raise 
awareness, the heart of America is indeed ready and willing to wage a 
twenty-first-century war against slavery. With the passing of the TVPA, 
the first legislative line was drawn and the combat began.  
II. THE SLOW START: BATTLING BUREAUCRACY AND                      
―UNINTENDED OBSTACLES‖ 
During the early years of TVPA‘s implementation, a number of 
analysts essentially concluded that though the heart was willing, the 
body was weak.27 America‘s first anti-trafficking initiative was bold and 
inspiring; implementation, however, was slow and struggled at first.28 
Critics expressed specific disappointment at the unsatisfactorily low 
levels of convictions compared to the projected magnitude of the crime, 
the inexcusable delays of certain agencies in acting upon certain 
                                                                                                                  
pubtrfrep.htm (last visited May 10, 2009) (demonstrating the gross disproportionality of 
statistics projecting the arrest ratio of pimps and johns versus prostitutes).  
24  While signing the second reauthorization of the TVPA into law, President Bush 
declared, ―America is a compassionate and decent nation, and we will not tolerate an 
industry that preys on the young and the vulnerable. The trade in human beings continues 
in our time and we are called by conscience and compassion to bring this cruel practice to 
an end.‖ Press Release, The White House, President Signs H.R. 972, Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/01/text/20060110-3.html. 
25  See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, tits. I–III, 122 Stat. 5044, 5044–87; Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558; Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875.  
26  Infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
27  Consider, for example, the 2004 statement of one policy expert before the House 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and Wellness: ―The standard I use to evaluate how well 
the [United States] is doing against trafficking is ‗Have the traffickers noticed yet?‘ and 
particularly, ‗Have the victims noticed yet?‘ The answer, overwhelmingly, even almost half 
a decade after the passage of the TVPA, is no.‖ Trafficking in Persons: The Federal 
Government’s Approach to Eradicate This Worldwide Problem: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Human Rights and Wellness of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 
108 (2004) [hereinafter Ellerman Testimony] (statement of Derek P. Ellerman, Co-
Executive Dir., Polaris Project). 
28  BATSTONE, supra note 4, at 239 (―Despite this strong legal framework, 
antitrafficking enforcement since the TVPA‘s passage in 2000 has been tepid.‖). 
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provisions, and the perceived imbalance of greater emphasis on 
prosecution rather than victim protection.29 
A. Low Levels of Prosecution 
In 2001, the first full year during which the TVPA‘s criminal 
trafficking provisions were enforced, only twenty-three of the thirty-
eight defendants charged with human trafficking related federal crimes 
were convicted.30 Over the next several years, the number of cases 
investigated increased,31 but the rate of successful prosecutions did not 
quickly improve. In the five-year span from 2001 to 2005, the DOJ 
reported that ―U.S. attorneys declined to prosecute suspects in 222 
matters‖—a figure that represents more than half of the trafficking 
matters that were closed during that period.32 
Though critics expressed disappointment over what some called 
these ―shockingly low‖33 numbers of prosecution under the TVPA that 
―pale in comparison‖ compared to the estimated number of victims,34 
                                                 
29  A number of articles that circulated in legal scholarship (predating the 2008 
TVPRA amendments) identified these concerns—and more—while critiquing the TVPA‘s 
shortcomings. See, e.g., Sally Terry Green, Protection for Victims of Child Sex Trafficking 
in the United States: Forging the Gap Between U.S. Immigration Laws and Human 
Trafficking Laws, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL‘Y 309 (2008); Dina Francesca Haynes, 
(Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to 
Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337 
(2007); Natalia Walter, Human Trafficking in the United States: Immigrant Victims 
Falling Through the Cracks, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 539 (Richard 
J. Link et al. eds., 2007); April Rieger, Note, Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex Trafficking Victims in the United States, 30 Harv. J.L. & 
Gender 231 (2007). 
30  DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at 49. These low numbers reflect ―a conviction rate of 
60 percent, which is below average for federal prosecutors, who usually convict 80 to 90 
percent of indicted defendants‖—an indicator that U.S. attorneys encountered ―special 
problems‖ prosecuting these cases. Id.  
31  ―Between 2001 and 2005, U.S. attorneys investigated 555 suspects in matters 
involving violations of Federal human trafficking statutes.‖ MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY 
KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, 
2001–2005, at 1 (2006) [hereinafter PROSECUTION STATISTICS 2001–2005], available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fpht05.pdf.  
32  Id.; see also infra note 55 (providing reasons for failure to prosecute). 
33  Hussein Sadruddin et al., Human Trafficking in the United States: Expanding 
Victim Protection Beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 379, 391 (2005). 
34  BATSTONE, supra note 4, at 239. Policy analyst Derek Ellerman also brought this 
fact to Congress‘ attention in 2004, stating that 
less than one percent of the estimated 17,000–20,000 international victims 
trafficked into the [United States] have been identified and assisted by the 
government, and almost half of those numbers came from a single case. If there 
is one statistic to remind us of how far we have to go, it is this one. . . . We must 
understand why we are failing . . . . 
Ellerman Testimony, supra note 27, at 108. 
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several external factors influence the analysis of these early statistics. 
First, the elusive nature of the crime makes human trafficking 
inherently difficult to discover and prosecute.35 Second, since the initial 
outcries over human trafficking in the United States, studies have 
identified what some label the ―Woozle Effect‖ of research statistics, 
calling the accuracy of initial estimates into question.36 Third, the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically shifted government 
priorities and reallocated funding in a way that likely affected anti- 
trafficking initiatives until 2006.37 The reality of these independent 
factors tempers the shock of the seemingly low number of prosecutions in 
the first few years of the TVPA‘s enactment. Still, certain weaknesses in 
                                                 
35  A sure part of the continuing struggle to effectively implement the TVPA lies in 
the inherent dynamics of human trafficking itself—a carefully concealed and largely 
underground criminal infrastructure. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection 
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, sec.102(20), 114 Stat. 1464, 1468 (codified as amended in 
22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(20) (2006)) (expressly recognizing the inherent difficulties of detecting 
and prosecuting human trafficking); AG ANN. REP., supra note 17.  
36  See, e.g., NEIL A. WEINER & NICOLE HALA, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MEASURING 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK CITY 8–10 (2008) [hereinafter MEASURING 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/224391.pdf. 
Based on an allusion to a Winnie the Pooh story in which the character follows his own 
footprints,  
[t]he Woozle Effect begins when one investigator reports a finding, often with 
qualifications (e.g., that the sample was small and not generalizable). A second 
investigator then cites the first study‘s data, but without the qualifications. 
Others then cite both reports, and ―the qualified data gain[s] the status of an 
unqualified, generalizable truth.‖ 
Id. at 8 (alteration to the original in quoted text) (citing Richard J. Gelles, Violence in the 
Family: A Review of Research in the Seventies, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873, 880 (1980)). 
The net result leads to ―distorted and obscured measurements of human trafficking.‖ Id. at 
10. At least one author has noted how the initial estimates, based on Amy O‘Neill Richard‘s 
April 2000 report, later proved ―too high.‖ DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at 32 (citing AMY 
O‘NEILL RICHARD, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING IN 
WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF SLAVERY AND 
ORGANIZED CRIME iii (2000) [hereinafter A. RICHARD], available at https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs 
monographs/trafficking.pdf); see also U.S. GOV‘T, ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT 
ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 7–9 (2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/wetf/us_assessment_2004.pdf (discussing how the 
government has ―continued to improve [its] data analysis‖ and methodologies as it refines 
its statistics measuring how many victims are trafficked into the United States each year 
and clarifying that the differences ―reflect improvements in data collection and 
methodology rather than trends in trafficking‖).  
37  DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at xx. After the terrorist attacks, which ―caused a 
massive shift in U.S. law enforcement priorities, redirecting attention and resources in the 
war against terrorism,‖ id., ―it took until 2004 for the trafficking center to become 
operational at even half-strength‖ id. at 51 (citing U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
COMBATING ALIEN SMUGGLING: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
44 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05305.pdf).  
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the TVPA‘s original framework likely affected the DOJ‘s ability to 
prosecute a greater number of traffickers during the early years.  
1. The Need for Victim Identification Training  
Traffickers cannot be successfully prosecuted if the victims cannot 
be readily discovered. An important area of weakness often criticized 
during the initial years of the TVPA was a lack of victim identification 
training among law enforcement officials at all levels.38 ―[A]s first 
responders and the ‗eyes and ears‘ of the local community, local law 
enforcement is in the best position to initially recognize, uncover, and 
respond to circumstances that may appear to be a routine street crime, 
but may ultimately turn out to be a human trafficking case[].‖39 Of 
approximately one million first responders in the form of local and state 
police officers,40 very few are equipped with the training necessary to 
                                                 
38  See, e.g., Ellerman Testimony, supra note 27, at 109 (identifying lack of victim 
identification as ―one of the largest obstacles to progress so far‖ in government prosecution 
efforts). To illustrate the problem, a random nationwide survey of about 3,000 local (state, 
county, and municipal) law enforcement agencies discovered that ―[t]he majority, between 
73 and 77 percent, of local, county and state law enforcement in the random sample . . . 
perceive human trafficking as rare or non-existent in their local communities.‖ AMY 
FARRELL ET AL., NE. UNIV. INST. ON RACE & JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING LAW 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING 3 (2008) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING 
AND IMPROVING], available at http://www.humantrafficking.neu.edu/news_reports/reports/ 
documents/Understanding%20and%20Responding_Full%20Report.pdf. ―There is little 
difference in perceptions of sex trafficking versus labor trafficking among local law 
enforcement—both types are perceived as rare or non-existent.‖ Id. 
Another recent government funded study that surveyed a random sample of sixty 
counties revealed that lack of victim identification often goes hand-in-hand with lack of 
awareness about trafficking legislation in general:  
In states with anti-trafficking statutes, 44 percent of law enforcement 
respondents and 50 percent of prosecutors report that their states do not have 
or they are not aware of having anti-trafficking legislation. In general, law 
enforcement, prosecutors, and service providers respondents could not: (1) 
differentiate between severe and non severe forms of human trafficking; (2) 
distinguish trafficking from smuggling; (3) differentiate domestic and 
international trafficking; (4) identify types of trafficking (sexual and labor), or 
(5) state the elements of trafficking.  
PHYLLIS J. NEWTON ET AL., NAT‘L OPINION RESEARCH CTR. (NORC), FINDING VICTIMS OF 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING, at v (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
224393.pdf. 
39  Department’s Anti-Trafficking Efforts Featured at International Association of 
Chiefs of Police Annual Conference, ANTI-TRAFFICKING NEWS BULL. (U.S. Dep‘t of Justice 
Civil Rights Div.), Nov./Dec. 2004, at 5, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/ 
trafficking_newsletter/antitraffnews_novdec04.pdf. The 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report 
also recognized that ―[a] child‘s first contact with authorities in destination countries could 
be the best opportunity to stop the trafficking chain.‖ U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS REPORT 18 (2006) [hereinafter TIP REPORT 2006], available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006. 
40  AG ANN. REP., supra note 17, at 35. 
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recognize a victim when encountered.41 Early training efforts existed 
primarily at the federal level, whereas critics argued that the urgent, 
immediate need for training existed at the state and local levels.42  
Not only did the original TVPA fail to sufficiently address the issue 
of victim identification regarding procedures, research, or training, but 
potential victims also suffered from existing anti-immigration prejudices 
among law enforcement, where officers untrained in human trafficking 
occasionally demonstrated a misguided43 and negative44 attitude toward 
enforcement of certain TVPA provisions.  
2. The Need for State Anti-Trafficking Legislation 
Early prosecution efforts under the TVPA also suffered for lack of 
adequate resources. After the bill passed and awareness of human 
trafficking swept across America, limits on federal resources—notably 
the deficiencies of manpower and funding45—quickly illuminated the 
                                                 
41  ―[G]overnment personnel . . . particularly outside of task forces headquartered in 
Washington, D.C., have little or no understanding of the obligations the nation undertook 
in passing the TVPA and, as a consequence, U.S. personnel are working contrary to the 
purposes of the Act.‖ Haynes, supra note 29, at 339. ―[O]nly a few highly ranked agency 
officials seem to understand how to recognize a victim of trafficking or what should be done 
with her when she is found.‖ Id. at 365.  
42  In the early years, TVPA funding for training programs was ―underutilized‖ and 
although the DOJ launched federal training programs for its investigators, there existed 
―few, if any, comparable training programs for officials at the state and local levels.‖ 
Rieger, supra note 29, at 246 (citing Kevin Bales et al., Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the 
United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 47, 75 (2005)). As local police and immigration 
officers are essentially the foot soldiers in America‘s war against trafficking, training for 
the use of a simple yes-or-no questionnaire could elicit the telling piece of information that 
transforms an everyday street criminal into a victim of a serious federal crime deserving of 
government protection. Id.  
43  See Bales, supra note 42, at 79 (―[F]ederal officials often refuse to issue 
endorsements of T visa applications. One service provider attributed this reluctance to the 
mistaken belief among law enforcement that the benefits are too generous and that ‗they 
are giving away a green card‘ by providing certification.‖). 
44  See Susan Tiefenbrun, The Saga of Susannah: A U.S. Remedy for Sex Trafficking 
in Women: The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 2002 UTAH L. 
REV. 107, 157 (2002) (reporting claims by immigration agents that ―sex trafficked victims 
are in the United States illegally and must be treated in the same manner as other 
undocumented workers‖ and ―it is unfair to ‗play favorites‘ because there are other illegal 
aliens who are also exploited by unscrupulous employers‖ (quoting A. RICHARD, supra note 
36, at 36)).  
45  Federal resources are often ―unavailable, limited, or inadequate.‖ Ellen L. 
Buckwalter et al., Modern Day Slavery in our Own Backyard, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 403, 425 (2006) (reporting, for example, that only 0.0022% of the federal budget was 
focused on anti-trafficking efforts in fiscal year 2004). Federal prosecution efforts, 
moreover, generally focus on large-scale trafficking cases that involve numerous victims, 
large rings of traffickers, multiple federal agencies, and even international investigations. 
Stephanie Richard, Note, State Legislation and Human Trafficking: Helpful or Harmful?, 
38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 469 (2005) [hereinafter S. Richard]. The U.S. government 
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need for state anti-trafficking measures and local enforcement.46 Strong 
advocacy for state legislation led the DOJ to release a Model State Anti-
Trafficking Criminal Statute in 2004,47 and almost every state has since 
enacted or initiated criminal provisions outlawing human trafficking.48 
This positive trend, however, opened the door for potential pitfalls that 
could inadvertently deny certain benefits to victims. Legal scholars have 
noted that incongruities between state legislation and the TVPA may 
negatively impact a victim‘s opportunity to receive federal benefits and 
protections.49 Misalignment with the TVPA‘s definitions, criminal 
elements, or certification requirements might cause victims who pursue 
state remedies to fall through the cracks and miss out on certain federal 
protections. This particularly poses a problem in light of the TVPA‘s 
immigration-related benefits.50 Ironically, if state legislation does not 
work together with the TVPA and its progeny, it could actually work 
against victims—the very persons the legislation aims to protect.  
3. Difficult Standard of Proof 
Prosecutorial difficulties revealed ―special problems‖ with the 
TVPA‘s criminal statutes.51 The DOJ recognized that two of the primary 
reasons U.S. attorneys declined to prosecute suspects in open 
investigations of trafficking matters from 2001 to 2005 were due to ―lack 
of evidence of criminal intent‖ and ―weak or insufficient admissible 
                                                                                                                  
reports that ―human trafficking cases are among the most labor- and time-intensive 
criminal investigations that the United States government undertakes,‖ putting an 
additional strain on already limited federal resources. Id. (citing U.S. GOV‘T, ASSESSMENT 
OF U.S. ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 10–11 (2003), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/23598.pdf). 
46  See Ellerman Testimony, supra note 27, at 110 (―The bottleneck that is 
constraining increased prosecution of traffickers is the resource constraints on federal law 
enforcement, the lack of state laws against trafficking, and the lack of enforcement of 
existing state laws related to trafficking.‖). State legislation complements the TVPA by 
enabling the prosecution of smaller-scale trafficking offenses and adapting to the unique 
needs of certain localities.  
47  MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE (U.S. Dep‘t of Justice 2004), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/model_state_law.pdf.  
48  See POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING REPORT-ALL PENDING LEGISLATION, 
http://www.trendtrack.com/texis/cq/viewrpt?event=49f99ef0e9&run=y (last visited May 10, 
2009) (providing an up-to-date synopsis of all state and federal anti-trafficking legislation).  
49  See, e.g., S. Richard, supra note 45, at 472–73. 
50  For instance, if an undocumented woman smuggled into America from another 
country was certified as a victim of human trafficking by state officials under state law, but 
failed the certification process under the TVPA, she would not be eligible to apply for a T 
visa or federal aid. Moreover, her dilemma is enhanced by concern over the lack of victim 
services and protection provisions in state legislation that fails to adopt the TVPA‘s 
comprehensive, victim-oriented approach. See id. at 462–75. 
51  DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at 49. 
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evidence.‖52 Since authorization of the TVPA in 2000, and through its 
amendments in 2003 and 2005, the criminal intent standard for the four 
trafficking-related crimes created by legislation had been ―knowingly.‖53 
By inference, federal prosecution efforts were likely hampered by the 
TVPA‘s heightened culpability standard.54 For example, the ―knowingly‖ 
requirement could easily frustrate conviction of a culprit in the 
trafficking chain whose role was limited to a particular aspect—such as 
physical transportation or financial backing—in such a way that 
subjective awareness would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove.55  
In addition, the ―knowingly‖ standard became a potential obstacle in 
the prosecution of sex traffickers in cases involving minors because the 
statute, as written, could be construed to require proof that the trafficker 
had knowledge of the victim‘s age.56 At the time, the TVPA did not allow 
                                                 
52  PROSECUTION STATISTICS 2001–2005, supra note 31, at 1. ―U.S. attorneys 
declined to prosecute suspects in 222 matters or 59% of the matters closed during this 
period . . . .‖ Id. The ―lack of evidence of criminal intent‖ problem surfaced in 29% of those 
cases. Id. Other evidentiary problems represented 28% of the reasons given for failure to 
prosecute. Id. 
53  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1592 (2006).  
54  The Model Penal Code, for example, designates a subjective awareness 
component into ―knowingly‖ standard, which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:  
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such 
circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b), 10A U.L.A. 94–95 (2001) (emphasis added).  
55  In this hypothetical, a smuggler of a trafficking victim may concede awareness of 
the fact he illegally facilitated movement of an undocumented person across the border but 
deny knowledge that the movement was for the purpose of, or resulted in, slavery. The 
trafficking chain usually involves an initial recruiter, who hands the victim over to a 
transporter, who hands the victim over to a handler, who hands the victim over to a 
customer who purchases a form of labor or service. Task Force on Human Trafficking, 
Chain of Trafficking, http://www.tfht.org/index.php?section=article&album_id=9&id=28 
(last visited May 10, 2009). There may be even more culpable parties along the chain who 
simply harbor victims or receive profits. Id. With so many culprits involved for short stints 
of time, often with limited roles, it is easy to imagine how a participant could feign 
ignorance of the end goal, which is slavery. 
56  See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2006). According to a coalition comprised of prominent 
anti-trafficking NGOs, this knowingly standard proved to be a problematic provision and 
an ―obstacle‖ to the prosecution of sex traffickers. THE ACTION GROUP, ACTION GROUP 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION 
ACT, http://www.theactiongroup.org/legislation/reauthorization.htm (last visited May 10, 
2009) [hereinafter ACTION GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS] (concerning the 2008 TVPRA). 
―Because minors in sex trafficking often have false identification or no identity documents, 
it is difficult for prosecutors to prove knowledge of their age.‖ Id. 
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for prosecution under a lesser standard of ―recklessly.‖57 Moreover, while 
the TVPA included an attempt provision,58 it did not yet provide a 
statutory avenue to prosecute for conspiracy to commit a trafficking-
related offense. 
B. Unreasonable Delays: Battling the Slow-Turning Wheels of Bureaucracy 
Bemoaned by critics, unreasonable bureaucratic delays in 
implementing certain TVPA provisions contributed to disappointment 
over the slow-starting legislation that seemed so promising on paper. A 
national news story that published on October 19, 2007, illustrates the 
problem particularly well: it announced the good news that since the 
creation of the ―U‖ visa in 2000,59 the government was finally getting 
around to processing the very first one.60 It only took seven years and a 
class-action lawsuit to get the ball rolling.61 Although the news called for 
                                                 
57  In contrast to the difficult-to-prove subjective analysis of the ―knowingly‖ 
standard, see supra note 54, the Model Penal Code definition for ―recklessly‖ would allow 
prosecutors to consider an objective element as well:  
 A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the 
actor‘s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would 
observe in the actor’s situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), 10A U.L.A. 95 (2001) (emphasis added).  
58  18 U.S.C. § 1594(a). 
59  Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. B, § 1513(a)–(b), 
114 Stat. 1491, 1533–35 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2006)). The U 
visa was designed to offer immigration benefits and temporary legal status to noncitizen 
victims of crimes—including trafficking victims—who assist prosecutorial efforts. See id. 
§1513(a)(2)(A) (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note).  
60  Roxana Hegeman, New US Visas Offered to Crime Victims, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-19-1565903989_x.htm. 
61  On March 6, 2007, plaintiffs (individuals and organizations on behalf of U visa 
applicants) filed a lawsuit against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (―USCIS‖) 
and Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (―DHS‖), alleging 
that, ―despite having six years to do so, defendants have unlawfully . . . failed to 
promulgate regulations, establish procedures, or publish application forms through which 
victims may apply for such visas.‖ Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, No. C07-1307PJH, 
2007 WL 2344995, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007). Plaintiffs sued under various statutory 
and constitutional provisions, id. at *2–3, and the court ultimately delayed evaluation of 
the case because the agency was ―in the process of enacting regulations,‖ id. at *8. The 
court concluded, however, that it would ―revisit this issue if regulations are not issued by 
January,‖ and ordered the government to ―file a monthly status report on the 15th of every 
month outlining the status of the regulations at issue.‖ Id. Following this lawsuit, on 
October 17, 2007, the long-awaited regulations governing the U visa were promulgated by 
USCIS, which allowed the agency to begin processing the applications. See Applications for 
the Exercise of Discretion Relating to U Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,035 (Sept. 
17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 212). 
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celebration on behalf of at least 8,919 petitioners who had waited years 
for their U visa applications to be processed,62 the story itself implicates 
the frustrations of a larger national nightmare—the ever-constant battle 
against the inherently slow-turning wheels of bureaucracy.63 A similar 
concern that worried T visa holders until late 2008 involved the lack of 
regulations necessary to enforce the TVPA‘s adjustment of status 
provision that should have been available to victims after three years.64  
As anti-trafficking initiatives compete with hundreds of other 
agency actions for attention, these types of unreasonable bureaucratic 
delays represent just one of the struggles that federal agencies face as 
they rely and depend on each other to implement the goals of the TVPA. 
C. Imbalanced Emphasis on Prosecution and Victims’ Struggle for Relief 
Before the 2008 TVPRA amendments, critics argued that the 
TVPA‘s design to protect victims was failing largely because of a skewed 
emphasis on prosecution and prevention rather than victim protection.65 
Especially in context of the T visa, victims suffered from a ―you help us 
                                                 
62  ―At least 8,919 aliens have requested U visa status, and approximately 7,494 
have been granted interim relief, and approximately 630 cases are pending.‖ Catholic 
Charities, 2007 WL 2344995, at *7. The interim relief equates to ―quasi-legal temporary 
status . . . which is no more than an exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to seek a crime 
victim‘s immediate deportation or removal and confers no legal status.‖ Id. at *1. 
63  One likely reason for such an unreasonable delay is that the provisions creating 
the U visa did not include a mandatory timeframe in which the DHS must issue 
regulations. See Violence Against Women Act, div. B, § 1513(b)(3), 114 Stat. at 1534–35. 
Absent statutory pressure, it was too easy for the U visa regulations to slip through the 
crack—for seven years. Trafficking victims also lack the necessary resources and political 
presence to demand legal enforcement of their rights. Hegeman, supra note 60 (―‗Because it 
was a largely poor, vulnerable population with no political clout, it took seven years,‘ said 
Peter A. Schey, lead counsel in the [Catholic Charities] lawsuit.‖). 
64  In its recommendations for the 2008 TVPRA, the Action Group advocated a 
statutory deadline for issuance of regulations concerning the T visa, emphasizing that  
[m]any victims have had their T-visas for three to four years. The delay in the 
issuance of adjustment regulations has deprived these individuals of many 
rights a T visa holder would have already had as a legal permanent resident, 
including freedom of travel in and out of the [United States]. Additionally, the 
delay . . . may add unnecessary waiting time for the T visa holder‘s path to 
citizenship. 
ACTION GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 56. This recommendation, however, became 
moot just two days before Congress passed the 2008 TVPRA. On December 8, 2008, USCIS 
finally announced an interim final rule that would allow T visa holders to adjust their 
status. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FACT SHEET: USCIS PUBLISHES NEW 
RULE FOR NONIMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SPECIFIED CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/t_u_fs_8dec2008.pdf [hereinafter 
USCIS FACT SHEET]. The rule implemented TVPA provisions that had been authorized 
eight years earlier. Id. 
65  See, e.g., Green, supra note 29, at 313 (―While the legislators may intend to 
address avenues for immediate protection for child sex victims in the TVPA, the protection 
prong is practically treated as the least significant of the three.‖). 
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before we will help you‖ attitude66 built into the TVPA‘s overly restrictive 
procedures for receiving assistance.67 
Victims were often thrust into the decision-making dilemma of 
whether to pursue the T visa, along with its accompanying federal 
benefits. Though designed to provide help and protection, the T visa 
initially contained some serious shortfalls, and the process of obtaining 
one involved such overly complex and contradictory mandates68 that the 
daunting application process could take upwards of nine months to 
complete.69 Victim advocates quickly realized that the T visa is not a 
golden ticket or cure-all solution for victims of severe trafficking who are 
caught in the web of a dangerous ring of criminals.70 For some victims, 
the ramifications of applying for a T visa may have put them in a more 
dangerous position, ―increasing their vulnerability‖ in several ways71 and 
creating ―‗a chilling effect‘ on survivors who wish to apply for T visas but 
are reluctant to place themselves at greater risk.‖72  
                                                 
66  The ―you help us before we will help you‖ attitude was best reflected by the 
statutory strings attached to the certification process, which imposed a so-called 
―cooperation condition‖ requiring certain victims to be ―willing to assist in every reasonable 
way in the investigation and prosecution‖ of their trafficker. Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A, sec.107(b)(1)(E)(i)(I), 114 Stat. 
1464, 1476 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(E)(i)(I) (2006)); see also Green, 
supra note 29, at 330–31. The TVPA elaborated: ―For the purpose of a certification under 
this subparagraph, the term ‗investigation and prosecution‘ includes—(I) identification of a 
person or persons who have committed severe forms of trafficking in persons; (II) location 
and apprehension of such persons; and (III) testimony at proceedings against such 
persons.‖ Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 sec. 107(b)(1)(E)(iii), 
114 Stat. at 1476 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(E)(iii)). These restrictions 
have since been tempered by the 2008 TVPRA amendments. See infra Part III.  
67  At the time, the T visa required ―that a person not only be a victim of a severe 
form of trafficking but also collaborate with law enforcement, be present in the United 
States as a result of being trafficked, and show that he or she would suffer severe harm 
upon removal.‖ ACTION GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 56 (labeling these 
requirements ―too onerous‖). 
68  See Walter, supra note 29, at 555. Even Congress later recognized that the 
original TVPA incorporated ―unintended obstacles‖ that blocked victims from obtaining 
relief and ―needed assistance,‖ particularly concerning the T visa. Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, sec. 2(3), 117 Stat. 2875. 
69  ACTION GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 56. 
70  See Haynes, supra note 29, at 378–79 (titling one section: ―Acknowledge the 
TVPA‘s Dirty Little Secret: The Grant of a T-Visa or Asylum Does Not Necessarily Obviate 
the Exploitation or End the Extortion‖).  
71  Bales, supra note 42, at 99.  
First, by alerting law enforcement to their presence, survivors without legal 
immigration status risk deportation if their account is found to lack credibility. 
Second, alleged perpetrators who are defendants in criminal proceedings have 
a right to review information provided by survivors to federal investigation. As 
a result, survivors and their families may be at a greater risk for retaliation.  
Id. at 99–100. 
72  Bales, supra note 42, at 100. 
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To some victims, after evaluation of the complexities of the process, 
it was not worth the time or hassle to apply for the temporary 
immigration relief. To others, the application would not be possible 
without the fortuitous happenstance of pro bono legal counsel. And still, 
for the vast majority of trafficking victims in the United States, 
application was not an option due to lack of awareness concerning their 
rights and available benefits under federal law. 
III. GAINING MOMENTUM: THE 2003, 2005, AND 2008 TVPRA 
AMENDMENTS 
The reauthorization acts in 2003, 2005, and most recently in 2008, 
have done much to put teeth in the TVPRA. Though initial statistics 
measuring the TVPRA‘s success in implementation seemed 
unsatisfactory, subsequent amendments have addressed various 
statutory weaknesses and paved the way for increased effectiveness. In 
particular, the amendments have helped fulfill the TVPA‘s aims of 
prosecution and protection by continually enhancing prosecutorial tools 
and increasing victim benefits.  
The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 
(―2003 TVPRA‖), among other things, extended T visa benefits to siblings 
of victims,73 raised the age requirement for victim certification from 
fifteen to eighteen,74 granted victims a private right of action to sue 
traffickers civilly for damages and attorneys‘ fees,75 and required an 
annual report from the Attorney General to track trafficking case 
statistics and enforcement progress.76 In an effort to increase 
coordination between the various federal agencies, the 2003 TVPRA 
created the Senior Policy Operating Group (―SPOG‖).77 Another provision 
revising the certification process responded to concerns that victims may 
                                                 
73  Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 sec. 4(b)(1)(B), 117 
Stat. at 2878 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(ii)(I) (2006)). This provision 
allowed ―unmarried siblings under [eighteen] years of age‖ to accompany or follow to join a 
T visa holder who is under twenty-one. Id. Previously this benefit extended only to the 
trafficking victim‘s ―spouse, children, and parents.‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(ii)(I) (2000).  
74  Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 sec. 4(b)(1)(A), 117 
Stat. at 2878 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(bb) (2006)). 
75  Id. sec. 4(a)(4) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2006)).  
76  Id. sec. 6(a), 117 Stat. at 2880 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7103(d)(7) 
(2006)) (requiring the Attorney General to submit an annual report including information 
measuring the TVPA‘s progress, such as the number of victims receiving benefits, the 
number of traffickers charged, and the type of law enforcement training conducted).  
77  Id. sec. 6(c), 117 Stat. at 2881 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7103(f) (2006)). 
SPOG ―consist[s] of the senior officials designated as representatives of the appointed 
members of the Task Force‖ and is ―chaired by the Director of the Office to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking of the Department of State.‖ 22 U.S.C. § 7103(f)(2)(A)–(B). Its main 
purpose is to ―coordinate activities of [f]ederal departments and agencies regarding 
[trafficking] policies.‖ Id. § 7103(f)(3). 
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unintentionally ―fall through the cracks‖ of the TVPA due to the 
increasing prevalence of state anti-trafficking laws and local 
enforcement efforts.78  
Two years later, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 200579 (―2005 TVPRA‖) again purposed to ―close loopholes‖ in the 
TVPA.80 Toward the aim of victim protection, it contained ―provisions to 
increase U.S. assistance to foreign trafficking victims . . . including 
access to legal counsel and better information on programs to aid 
victims.‖81 To enhance prosecution, the 2005 TVPRA added a forfeiture 
provision to the toolbox for federal attorneys,82 which should also serve to 
increase deterrence because the nature of the crime involves great 
financial benefit to the traffickers involved. Along the lines of deterrence, 
and as a somewhat controversial matter of public policy,83 the 2005 
TVPRA also made significant efforts to decrease the demand for human 
trafficking.84 And again, legislative efforts encouraged increased state 
and local involvement.85  
                                                 
78  Previously, the certification process considered statements only from federal 
officials that the victim cooperated with federal investigations; the 2003 TVPRA expanded 
the TVPA so that the  
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consider statements from State 
and local law enforcement officials that the person . . . has been willing to assist 
in every reasonable way with respect to the investigation and prosecution of 
State and local crimes . . . where severe forms of trafficking appear to have 
been involved.  
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 sec. 4(a)(3), 117 Stat. at 2877–
78 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(E)(iv) (2006)) (emphasis added); see also 
id. sec.4(b)(2), 117 Stat. at 2878 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1184(o)(6)) (adjusting the 
corresponding provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
79  Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 
119 Stat. 3558 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, and 42 U.S.C).  
80  CRS Report, supra note 9, at 43. 
81  Id.; see, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 sec. 
102(a), 119 Stat. at 3560–61 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(2)) (―To the extent practicable, 
victims of severe forms of [human] trafficking shall have access to information about 
federally funded or administered anti-trafficking programs that provide services to victims 
of severe forms of trafficking.‖).  
82  Id. sec. 103(d), 119 Stat. at 3563 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2428(a)(1)–(2) (2006)) 
(requiring trafficking offenders to surrender to the government ―any property, real or 
personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of 
such violation‖ as well as ―any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from any 
proceeds that such person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation‖); id. 
sec. 104(b)(1)(A), 119 Stat. 3558, 3564 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7106(b) (2006)) 
(mandating demand-reducing measures ―for commercial sex acts and for participation in 
international sex tourism‖).  
83  See infra Part IV.B.  
84  See id. sec. 201(a), (a)(2)(A), 119 Stat. at 3567–68 (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 14044(a), (a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2006)) (implementing a ―Program to reduce trafficking in 
persons and demand for commercial sex acts in the United States‖ that mandated 
comprehensive research reports and instituted an annual conference ―addressing severe 
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The 2008 TVPRA, however, implements sweeping reforms to the 
TVPA and thus packs the most powerful punch in America‘s legislative 
battle over human trafficking.86 The 2008 TVPRA continues to solve 
problems, mend gaps, and build bridges between government bodies. 
With its passing on December 10, 2008,87 abolitionist advocates 
celebrated a promising victory in the fight for national anti-trafficking 
legislation that is not only comprehensive but effective.88 Some notable 
revisions to the problems addressed supra include:  
Elimination of the “cooperation condition.” Section 201 softens 
the former ―you help us before we will help you‖ stance of the bill that 
essentially required victim cooperation in prosecution efforts to become 
eligible for important immigration benefits,89 providing an important 
exception for victims who are deemed ―unable to cooperate . . . due to 
physical or psychological trauma.‖90  
                                                                                                                  
forms of trafficking in persons and commercial sex acts that occur, in whole or in part, 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States‖).  
85  See id. sec. 204, 119 Stat. at 3571 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14044c(a) (Supp. V 
2006)) (authorizing grants ―to establish, develop, expand, or strengthen‖ state anti-
trafficking programs).  
86  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, tits. I–III, 122 Stat. 5044, 5044–87 (to be codified in scattered sections 
of 6, 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ457.110.pdf. 
87  TVPRA of 2008 Legislative History, supra note 2. 
88  A U.S.-based legislative coalition comprised of ten prominent organizations 
―dedicated to abolishing modern-day slavery and human trafficking‖ published a news 
release ―enthusiastically congratulat[ing] Congress for passing the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008.‖ Press Release, Action Group, 
Congress Passes the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008 (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.theactiongroup.org/legislation/ 
TSG_News_Release.pdf. The Action Group celebrated the fact that the 2008 TVPRA 
amendments incorporated twenty and a half of the coalition‘s twenty-two legislative 
recommendations. Id; see also ACTION GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 56. Others 
from across the political spectrum also applauded the bill‘s passing. Compare Press 
Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Applauds Passage of Human Trafficking 
Legislation (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/employ/ 
38058prs20081211.html, with Adele Banks, Bush Signs Anti-Trafficking Bill, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Dec. 26, 2008 (―Religious leaders hailed President Bush‘s signing of a bill that 
continues [United States] efforts to combat human trafficking across the globe.‖).  
89  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
90  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
tit. II, sec. 201(a)(1)(D)(iii)(bb), 122 Stat. at 5052 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(T)). The Action Group explains that ―[w]hile most victims of trafficking will 
readily comply with law enforcement requests, occasionally victims are unable to cooperate 
due to physical or emotional limitations or due to fear for their own safety or the safety of 
their family members.‖ ACTION GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 56. 
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Less stringent T visa requirements. Section 201 eases another of 
the previously ―onerous‖ T visa requirements91 by adjusting the physical 
presence condition.92  
Expanded T visa benefits. Section 201 expanded immigration 
benefits by authorizing derivative T visas for parents and siblings of 
adult trafficking victims who may be at risk of retaliation due to the 
victim‘s escape from trafficking or cooperation with law enforcement.93 
Facilitation of victim benefits and rights education. Section 
202 mandates the development and distribution of an information 
pamphlet that educates potential victims about their legal rights and 
available resources,94 including telephone hotlines,95 thus ameliorating 
the difficulty for victims to obtain necessary services under the TVPA 
due to lack of awareness. Notably, the mandate includes a translation 
provision96 and sets a deadline of 180 days to distribute the pamphlet.97  
Facilitation of free legal services for child victims. Section 235 
guarantees that the Secretary of Health and Human Services will ensure 
―to the greatest extent practicable‖ that all unaccompanied child victims 
under their care ―have counsel to represent them in legal proceedings or 
matters and protect them from mistreatment, exploitation, and 
                                                 
91  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
92  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
tit. II, sec. 201(a)(1)(C), 122 Stat. at 5052 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)) 
(modifying the physical presence on account of trafficking requirement by ―including 
physical presence on account of the alien having been allowed entry into the United States 
for participation in investigative or judicial processes associated with an act or a 
perpetrator of trafficking‖).  
93  Id. sec. 201(a)(2)(C), 122 Stat. at 5053 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)) 
(extending the derivative T visa to ―any parent or unmarried sibling under [eighteen] years 
of age‖ who risk retaliation). Previously, only minor victims could bring parents and 
siblings into the United States on derivative T visas, whereas adult victims were limited to 
their spouse or children. ACTION GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 56. The Action 
Group advocated that  
[t]he requirement for adult victims should be changed to enable them to bring 
parents and siblings in addition to their spouse and children for three reasons: 
1) these family members often feel threatened in their home country though 
such threats are often hard to prove; 2) it will assist the victim‘s recovery to 
know that close family members are safe; and 3) it will assist the victim to have 
the moral support of close family in the [United States] if the victim is a 
witness in a criminal or civil case against a trafficker. 
Id. 
94  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
tit. II, sec. 202(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 5055 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b)). 
95  Id. tit. II, sec. 202(b)(5)(A)–(B), 122 Stat. at 5055 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1375(b)).  
96  Id. tit. II, sec. 202(c), 122 Stat. at 5055–56 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b)). 
97  Id. tit. II, sec. 202(d)(3), 122 Stat. at 5056 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b)). 
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trafficking.‖98 The provision also requires the Secretary to ―make every 
effort to utilize the services of pro bono counsel who agree to provide 
representation to such children without charge.‖99 
Statutorily mandated deadlines. The inclusion of statutorily 
mandated deadlines attached to many of the new provisions help combat 
the inherently slow-turning wheels of bureaucracy and provide an 
administrative remedy for enforcement if deadlines are missed and 
delays become unreasonable.100  
Gap-filling provisions for delayed issuance of regulations. In 
several places, the 2008 TVPRA amendments mitigate the risk that 
unreasonable agency delay in issuing the regulations necessary to 
implement certain provisions would deny victims benefits.101 
Enhanced criminal provisions. Prosecution efforts will be 
enhanced by helpful revisions to existing criminal statutes and the 
addition of new tools.102 Several provisions ease the difficult-to-prove 
―knowingly‖ culpability standard by adding a ―reckless disregard‖ 
alternative.103 Section 222(b) adds a mechanism to punish obstruction of 
various trafficking crimes.104 Section 222(c) supplies a new prosecutorial 
                                                 
98  Id. tit. II, sec.235(c)(5), 122 Stat. at 5079 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1232). 
99  Id. 
100  E.g., id. tit. II, sec. 202(d)(3), 122 Stat. at 5056 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1375(b)) (imposing a 180-day pamphlet distribution deadline). 
101  See, e.g., id. tit. II, sec. 201(b)(1)(C), 122 Stat. at 5053 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(o)(7)) (addressing the situation where a T visa holder is eligible for adjustment of 
status but ―is unable to obtain such relief because regulations have not been issued to 
implement such section‖); id. tit. II, sec. 201(c), 122 Stat. at 5053 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1184(p)(6)) (extending nonimmigration status in certain cases where the applicant for 
admission meets eligibility requirements and ―is unable to obtain . . . relief because 
regulations have not been issued to implement such section‖); id. tit. II, sec. 211(b), 122 
Stat. at 5063 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1641 note) (ensuring that amendments to certain 
work authorization benefits will be effective ―without regard to whether regulations have 
been implemented to carry out such amendments‖). Though USCIS published an interim 
final rule allowing T and U visa holders to adjust their status just days before the bill‘s 
passing, see USCIS FACT SHEET, supra note 64, these provisions illustrate the TVPRA‘s 
responsiveness to problems identified by the public and its adaptability in addressing 
unintended loopholes.  
102  See generally William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008 tit. II, sec. 222, 122 Stat. at 5067–71 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8, 
and 18 U.S.C.). 
103  See, e.g., id. tit. II, sec. 222(b)(3), § 1589, 122 Stat. at 5068 (to be codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1589) (amending forced labor statute); id. tit. II, sec. 222(b)(5), § 1589, 122 Stat. at 
5069 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (amending sex trafficking of children statute).  
104  Id. tit. II, sec. 222(b), 122 Stat. at 5067–70 (to be codified in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C.) (amending five trafficking-related crimes); e.g., id. tit. II, sec. 222(b)(1), 
§ 1583(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 5067–68 (―Whoever . . . obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, or in 
any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than [twenty] years, or both.‖). 
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tool by adding a conspiracy provision specific to trafficking offenses.105 
Section 222(d) creates a new crime designed to punish those who 
financially benefit from ―[p]eonage, [s]lavery, and [t]rafficking in 
[p]ersons,‖ even if the profiteer did not facilitate the underlying crime.106 
Clarified sex trafficking provisions. Section 222(b)(5) added 
several definitional clarifications to the sex trafficking statute,107 as well 
as a legal clarification that in cases of child sex trafficking, ―the 
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person 
had not attained the age of [eighteen] years.‖108 
Mandatory training provisions. Several sections take important 
steps toward solving earlier criticisms of the bill that law enforcement 
agents are inadequately trained to identify victims and have 
demonstrated a misguided and negative attitude toward the enforcement 
of certain TVPA provisions.109 
Increased federal-state coordination. Various provisions of the 
2008 TVPRA seek to increase coordination of state anti-trafficking 
                                                 
105  Id. tit. II, sec. 222(c), 122 Stat. at 5070 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1594). This 
provision will be helpful to prosecutors who previously relied on a general conspiracy 
statute that imposed a maximum of five years imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
106  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
tit. II, sec. 222(d), 122 Stat. at 5070 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1593(A)). Notably, the 
culpability standard is knowingly or recklessly:  
Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, 
from participation in a venture which has engaged in any act in violation of 
section 1581(a), 1592, or 1595(a), knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact 
that the venture has engaged in such violation, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned in the same manner as a completed violation of such section.  
Id. tit. II, sec. 222(d), § 1593A, 122 Stat. at 5070 (emphasis added). 
107  For instance, the Section clarified two previously ambiguous terms in the 
definition of ―coercion‖ for purposes of the crime. Id. tit. II, sec. 222(b)(5)(E)(iii), 122 Stat. at 
5069–70 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(1)) (defining ―abuse or threatened abuse of 
law or legal process‖); id. tit. II, sec. 222(b)(5)(E)(iv), 122 Stat. at 5070 (to be codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4)) (defining ―serious harm‖ as encompassing ―physical or nonphysical, 
including psychological, financial, or reputational harm‖). 
108  Id. tit. II, sec. 222(b)(5)(D), 122 Stat. at 5069 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1591(c)); cf. supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
109  E.g., William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 tit. II, sec. 203(b)(3), 122 Stat. at 5058 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1375(c)) 
(mandating training of consular officers who conduct interviews with certain at-risk visa 
applicants); id. tit. II, sec. 212(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 5064 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7105(c)(4)) (―The Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
shall provide training to State and local officials to improve the identification and 
protection of such victims . . . .‖); id. tit. II, sec. 235(e), 122 Stat. at 5081 (to be codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1232) (―The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services, and the Attorney General shall provide specialized training 
to all Federal personnel, and upon request, state and local personnel, who have substantive 
contact with unaccompanied alien children.‖); cf. supra Part II.A.1. 
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efforts with federal efforts.110 In particular, Section 225 seeks to ensure 
that that conflicting federal and state criminal laws will not ―preempt, 
supplant, or limit‖ each other.111  
Though the 2008 TVPRA heralds a number of significant victories—
addressing legislative and policy concerns alike—there is yet room for 
improvement, particularly in the areas of the T visa requirements112 and 
certain criminal statutes.113 Moreover, the 2008 TVPRA raises subtle 
warning flags that reinforce the need for a strategic framework as a key 
tactical element to help in the fight against trafficking. 
IV. TOO MUCH MOMENTUM?: POTENTIAL LANDMINES 
Since the issue of human trafficking emerged on the national radar 
and started to gain political momentum in the late 1990s, legislators, 
lobbyists, researchers, scholars, and journalists mobilized on the issue 
relatively quickly.114 Passion for combating this issue transcends party 
lines, race, and religious beliefs. The explosion of passion, however, has 
                                                 
110  E.g., William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 tit. II, sec. 205(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 5060–61 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(C)) 
(―The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall—(i) 
develop materials to assist State and local law enforcement officials in working with 
Federal law enforcement to obtain continued presence for victims of a severe form of 
trafficking in cases investigated or prosecuted at the State or local level; and (ii) distribute 
the materials developed under clause (i) to State and local law enforcement officials.‖). 
111  Id. tit. II, sec. 225(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 5072 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 
note). In relevant part, the provision reads: 
Nothing in this Act, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, chapters 77 and 117 of title 18, 
United States Code, or any model law issued by the Department of Justice to 
carry out the purposes of any of the aforementioned statutes . . . shall preempt, 
supplant, or limit the effect of any State or Federal criminal law.  
Id.  
112  Significantly, the two requirements that are likely the most time consuming and 
―onerous‖ in the process—the showings of a severe form of trafficking and severe harm 
upon removal—remain intact despite the 2008 TVPRA amendments. See supra note 67. 
113  Notably, though the 2008 TVPRA amendments revised the criminal intent 
standard for sex trafficking crimes by adding a ―reckless‖ provision, the parallel labor 
trafficking provision still relies solely on a ―knowingly‖ standard. See 18 U.S.C. § 1590 
(2006); supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
114  Placed in context: during the past decade, national legislation has been drafted, 
passed, signed, enforced, and thrice amended. See supra notes 3 and 25 and accompanying 
text. Almost every state, as of this writing, has initiated or enacted local anti-trafficking 
provisions. See supra note 48. Journalists, researchers, and scholars have published 
thousands of pages of reports, articles, statistics, and books on the topic. See, e.g., supra 
note 29. Evidence of the explosion: a simple Google search on ―human trafficking‖ and 
―America‖ yields more than one million results. Google Home Page, http://www.google.com 
(search ―‗human trafficking‘ and America‖) (last visited May 10, 2009). 
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led to a snowball effect of sorts, as ideas evolve and ideals collide.115 
Amid the explosion, several landmines have cropped up that threaten to 
frustrate the progress of certain battles in America‘s war on human 
trafficking.  
A. The Definition Debate 
―What is human trafficking?‖ The answer to this foundational 
question is informed by one‘s personal, or even legal, framework.116 
Varying viewpoints invariably lead to varying definitions. In legislating 
the scope and boundaries of human trafficking as a crime, much hinges 
on the arrangement of particular wording in definitional provisions.117 
Anti-trafficking laws impacting the United States exist at three levels—
state, federal, international.118 Although these pieces of legislation cast 
―a kind of definitional anchor,‖ none ―define human trafficking or 
trafficking victimization in exactly the same way.‖119 The definitional 
provisions at each level have triggered ongoing lengthy political debate120 
                                                 
115  The collision of politics with advocacy efforts to eradicate human trafficking 
necessarily leads to ―various arguments and emotions of those who are intimately 
involved,‖ which in turn leads to ―problems in defining the dimensions of the trafficking 
problem and developing policies to deal with it.‖ DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at xvii. 
116 If viewed narrowly as an immigration crime, for instance, human trafficking 
requires the illegal physical movement of persons across borders. If viewed more broadly as 
a human rights violation, however, emphasis on illegal travel decreases and emphasis on 
the end result of exploitation increases.  
117  For an illustration of how these criminal provisions can be categorized according 
to the process, means, and resulting goal, see TIP REPORT 2008, supra note 6, at 290 
(providing a chart designed to help analyze a universal definition of human trafficking).  
118  In addition to the TVPA and the multiple versions of state laws that have 
developed over the past decade, see supra notes 3, 25, and 48 and accompanying text, the 
United States signed and ratified the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16, 40 I.L.M. 335, 
377–84, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2003/Texts/treaty2E.pdf; 
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, SIGNATORIES TO THE CTOC TRAFFICKING PROTOCOL 
(Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-trafficking 
protocol.html.  
119  MEASURING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 36, at 18.  
120  For instance, ―battle lines‖ in the definition debate were drawn in Congress 
during the late 1990s in a way that ―mirrored those in the concurrent U.N. deliberations.‖ 
Id. The two main camps involved religious/feminist groups and human rights/labor 
rights/immigration advocates: 
Religious and feminist groups insisted that trafficking for prostitution was a 
―special evil‖ that should be addressed separately from labor trafficking. 
Prostitution ―abolitionists‖ objected particularly to the inclusion of the force, 
fraud, and coercion criteria in the definition of sex trafficking, considering 
prostitution criminally exploitative under any conditions and thus essentially 
different from work in other domains. On the other side, human rights, labor, 
and immigration advocates insisted that human trafficking be defined by 
internationally recognized and legally translatable elements—forced labor, 
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and vigorous disagreement,121 which tends to delay the enactment 
process.122  
Beyond slowing the legislative process, the implications of these 
definitional debates—and the differences between statutory provisions—
are far reaching, impacting not only a victim‘s ability to receive 
appropriate relief and government benefits,123 but also methodologies for 
victim screening protocols124 and gathering statistical research data.125 
                                                                                                                  
slavery, and servitude—rather than by reference to the kind of work migrants 
might perform.  
Id. (internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted).  
121  Disagreement over an early proposal for what eventually became enacted as the 
2008 TVPRA, for instance, sparked intense debate about whether the proposed 
amendments would broaden the scope of human trafficking so much by definition that the 
TVPA would effectively encompass prostitution-related crimes traditionally reserved for 
state and local law enforcement. Compare BRIAN W. Walsh & Andrew M. Grossman, 
Human Trafficking Reauthorization Would Undermine Existing Anti-Trafficking Efforts 
and Constitutional Federalism, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Feb. 14, 
2008, at 1, 1, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/upload/lm_21.pdf 
(―The TVPRA trivializes the seriousness of actual human trafficking by equating it with 
run-of-the-mill sex crimes—such as pimping, pandering, and prostitution—that are neither 
international nor interstate in nature. The net effect of this unconstitutional federalization 
of local crime would be to blur the respective lines of federal and state authority, assert 
federal supremacy without providing sufficient federal resources, and thus undermine the 
efforts of state law enforcement against both ordinary sex crimes and the local effects of 
human trafficking.‖), with Press Release, Equality Now, Statement of Jessica Neuwirth, 
President of Equality Now, to the New York City Council (June 11, 2008), 
http://www.equalitynow.org/english/pressroom/press_releases/presidentstatement_2008061
3_en.html (―Critics of the House bill claim that the bill ‗federalizes prostitution.‘ It does no 
such thing. The crime of prostitution is nowhere in the bill. The House bill recognizes that 
many pimps are sex traffickers and integrates the crime of pimping into the sex trafficking 
legislative framework, that is a reflection of reality—not only the reality of sex trafficking 
but even the reality of the Justice Department‘s sex trafficking cases to date. It is not the 
enormous expansion of the TVPA that [critics] claim[].‖).  
122  See MEASURING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 36, at 18, 23. The ―[o]ngoing 
debate continues to delay the passage of legislation in a number of U.S. states,‖ and likely 
delayed the latest reauthorization to the TVPA, which, although first proposed in January 
2007, did not pass until almost two years later in December 2008. See id. at 18; Edward 
Babayan, Legislative Watch, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2007, at 53, 54, available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/3legislative.pdf?rd=1; TVPRA of 2008 Legislative 
History, supra note 2. 
123  See supra Part II.A.2.  
124  MEASURING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 36, at 18–23. One national survey 
identified ―[a]mbiguous and sometimes contradictory definitions of human trafficking and 
new, untested laws‖ as obstacles encountered by anti-trafficking task forces. 
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING, supra note 38, at 10. ―These ambiguities result in 
disagreements among members about whether a person is a victim of human trafficking.‖ 
Id.  
125  MEASURING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 36, at 6 (―International data 
collection is hampered by differences in the way nations define human trafficking.‖); id. at 
11–12 (identifying seven different categories of victims); id. at 18 (―‗[D]efining key terms 
and understanding and applying them uniformly are at the heart of establishing 
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Overall, differences in definitions make it difficult to standardize certain 
tools that are vital to fighting the war on human trafficking. Just as it is 
difficult to fight a war against an enemy who is not clearly defined, lack 
of uniformity among statutory definitions can lead to confusion that 
impedes effectiveness in the war on human trafficking.  
B. The Demand Debate and the Infamous “Anti-Prostitution Pledge”  
As one‘s personal or legal framework colors the debate over how 
human trafficking should be defined, so it colors one‘s viewpoint on how 
it should be fought. The debate surrounding which battle strategy best 
fits the war on human trafficking derives from one simple equation: 
SUPPLY + DEMAND = HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Though some prefer to tackle supply and demand equally and 
simultaneously,126 others prefer to focus more heavily on the supply 
side.127 The Bush Administration, however, made a policy decision to 
tackle the demand side of the equation and focused its attention 
specifically on eradicating the demand for sex trafficking.128 This 
                                                                                                                  
standardized data and of ensuring reliability of statistics.‘‖ (quoting INT‘L ORG. FOR 
MIGRATION (IOM), ASEAN AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: USING DATA AS A TOOL TO 
COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 27 (2007), available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/ 
site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/lowres%20asean%20report-
complete.pdf)). 
126  These advocates call for a merger of the interdependent battles against poverty 
and human trafficking. See, e.g., KEVIN BALES, ENDING SLAVERY: HOW WE FREE TODAY‘S 
SLAVES 219 (2007) (―[N]ot only does combating poverty help to end slavery, but combating 
slavery helps to end poverty.‖); id. at 226 (―A great deal of thought, theory, and practice 
focuses on ending poverty, rather less on ending slavery. What is becoming clear is that 
these two goals should be harnessed together; their combined strength is greater than the 
sum of the parts.‖).  
127  See, e.g., DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at xxvii (―Powerful economic needs impel 
people to put themselves at risk by turning to traffickers. Only when governments address 
those needs will such risky behavior be reduced.‖). DeStefano advocates that ―[i]t is 
better . . . to give victims places to turn to for help—refuges such as law enforcement 
protection, social services, and coveted green cards—rather than take on the hopeless task 
of mandating an end to sex work.‖ Id. at xxvi. 
128  See id. at 107–17. In 2003, the Bush Administration, which had adopted a strong 
anti-prostitution stance, responded to pressure to ―link‖ this policy with its anti-trafficking 
policies. Id. at 108–09. Various publications soon began to surface ―linking‖ prostitution 
with sex trafficking. See, e.g., O‘CONNOR & HEALY, supra. In turn, the 2005 TVPRA made 
significant amendments to the TVPA that addressed the problem of demand. See supra 
note 82. While signing the 2005 TVPRA, the President declared:  
[W]e cannot put the criminals out of business until we also confront the 
problem of demand. Those who pay for the chance to sexually abuse children 
and teenage girls must be held to account. . . . So we‘ll investigate and 
prosecute the customers, the unscrupulous adults who prey on the young and 
the innocent. 
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demand-centered policy enjoyed the support of other U.S. government 
agencies129 and many anti-trafficking advocates who view sex trafficking 
as inextricably linked to prostitution.130 As it played out in legislation, 
however—most conspicuously in regard to the TVPA‘s so-called ―Anti-
Prostitution Pledge‖131—it garnered controversy and debate,132 polarizing 
                                                                                                                  
Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at Signing of H.R. 972, 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Jan. 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.sharedhope.org/images/Presidential_Letter.pdf.  
129  See BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, THE LINK BETWEEN 
PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/38901.pdf (―Prostitution and related activities—including pimping and 
patronizing or maintaining brothels—fuel the growth of modern-day slavery by providing a 
façade behind which traffickers for sexual exploitation operate.‖); U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 27 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/82902.pdf (―Where prostitution is tolerated, there is a greater demand for 
human trafficking victims and nearly always an increase in the number of women and 
children trafficked into commercial sex slavery.‖). 
130  See, e.g., Beverly LaHaye Inst., Concerned Women for Am., Dr. Janice Crouse 
Testifies Before Maryland Legislature, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.cwfa.org/articles/14671/ 
BLI/commentary/index.htm (―Prostitution and sex trafficking are inextricably linked and 
the bond that cements them is demand.‖); MONICA O‘CONNOR & GRAINNE HEALY, THE 
LINKS BETWEEN PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING: A BRIEFING HANDBOOK 3 (2006), 
available at http://action.web.ca/home/catw/attach/handbook.pdf; DONNA M. HUGHES, THE 
DEMAND FOR VICTIMS OF SEX TRAFFICKING 5 (2005), available at http://www.uri.edu/ 
artsci/wms/hughes/demand_for_victims.pdf (―Where prostitution is flourishing, pimps 
cannot recruit enough local women to fill up the brothels, so they have to bring in victims 
from other places.‖). 
131  A controversial provision of the 2003 TVPRA declared that ―[n]o funds made 
available to carry out this division . . . may be used to promote, support, or advocate the 
legalization or practice of prostitution.‖ Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, sec. 7(7), 117 Stat. 2875, 2885–86 (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. § 7110(g) (2006)). It also attached a condition on funding, essentially requiring 
recipient organizations to adopt a legal policy opposing prostitution. Id. Though still in 
effect despite the 2008 amendments, the condition has been vigorously opposed by certain 
groups that advocate human rights for sex workers. See, e.g., Press Release, Urban Justice 
Ctr., The Sex Workers Project Welcomes Increased Protections for Trafficked Persons (Dec. 
12, 2008), available at http://www.sexworkersproject.org/downloads/20081212-tvpra-
passage-pr.pdf (labeling the condition the ―infamous ‗Anti-Prostitution Pledge‘‖); Film: 
Taking the Pledge (Network of Sex Work Projects 2006), available at 
http://www.sexworkerspresent.blip.tv/file/181155 (labeling the funding restrictions a 
―prostitution gag rule,‖ that, in effect, ―prevent[s] sex workers from helping to create 
responses to trafficking and prostitution‖). For sex worker advocates, ―[t]he anti-
prostitution pledge requirement . . . claims moral high ground while eclipsing the plight of 
many trafficked people and sex workers.‖ Id.  
132  See, e.g., Laura Blumenfeld, In a Shift, Anti-Prostitution Effort Targets Pimps 
and Johns, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/14/AR2005121402539.html; 
Talk of the Nation, Authorities Target Customers to Curb Prostitution (NPR Radio 
Broadcast Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=5064700 (radio show debating the effectiveness of law enforcement‘s 
focus on the demand side of prostitution).  
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certain groups of activists133 and even leading to litigation.134 ―The fight 
over prostitution as it related to sex trafficking . . . had become a moral 
battle.‖135 
The heated debate surrounding demand and concerning the 
―infamous‖ Anti-Prostitution Pledge only underscores the need for the 
current presidential administration to quell the bickering over the best 
tactic for fighting human trafficking. As our nation‘s central authority 
figure, the President must clearly delineate a battle strategy that all 
government agencies and private organizations can rally around, despite 
individual disagreement.136 Ideally, this long-term strategy should 
address both the supply and demand sides of the equation, though the 
President‘s policy may elect to emphasize or prioritize one over the other 
in the short term. 
C. Whose Role Is It Anyway?: Friction Between Government Agencies and 
Differing Department Priorities 
The anti-trafficking movement calls for ―an unprecedented degree of 
coordination between state and federal justice departments.‖137 The 
daunting task of governmental coordination poses both horizontal and 
vertical challenges. Horizontally, competing federal agencies tasked with 
enforcement of the TVPA and its amendments must coordinate their 
efforts to work together in an expedient fashion. Vertically, states must 
coordinate their efforts with the federal government in order to 
streamline effective enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and guarantee 
adequate protection of victims.138 
The TVPA‘s Interagency Task Force, uniting no less than nine 
different federal agencies or departments tasked with spearheading the 
implementation of the TVPA and its amendments,139 is a prime example 
                                                 
133  DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at xxi (presenting his view that ―by focusing so much 
attention on sex work . . . the U.S. debate about trafficking has become a way for anti-
prostitution zealots to single out sex work as a particular evil. They have found ready allies 
in the Bush Administration, which has advanced legislation and policies to conform to the 
anti-prostitution agenda while further polarizing human rights advocates working on the 
trafficking issue‖). 
134  See DKT Int‘l v. U.S. Agency for Int‘l Dev., 435 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 
477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
135  DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at 111. 
136  See infra Part V (suggesting that a timetable governing specifically delineated 
goals will help implement a long-term strategy).  
137  Bales, supra note 42, at 80. 
138  For discussion of this issue, see supra Part II.A.2. 
139  See 22 U.S.C. § 7103(b) (2006). This is no small task, as the Task Force members 
constitute representatives of a of a wide array of agencies, including ―the Secretary of 
State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, [and] the Secretary of 
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of how coordination represents one of the main struggles in the 
implementation of anti-trafficking initiatives. Though on the surface, the 
collaborative approach of the Task Force appears to make significant 
headway toward the goal of streamlining implementation of the TVPA, 
government officials point to lingering challenges such as interagency 
rivalries,140 inconsistent case approaches due to differing agency 
priorities,141 and the logistical difficulties of coordinating large numbers 
of agency employees and participants. For example, DHS and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (―HHS‖)—two government 
agencies heavily involved in the critical processes of apprehension and 
victim identification—have markedly different missions.142 Even within 
the TVPA, friction between competing agencies—especially in light of 
certain provisions added by the 2008 TVPRA143—underscores the need to 
                                                                                                                  
Homeland Security.‖ Id.; see also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, tit. I, sec. 101, 122 Stat. 5044, 5045 (to 
be codified at 22 U.S.C. 7103(b)) (amending Section 7103(b) to include the ―Secretary of 
Education‖). 
140  See Bales, supra note 42, at 78; Haynes, supra note 29, at 376. 
141  UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING, supra note 38, at 10 (identifying ―[t]enuous 
relationships among task force members who operated with different and at times 
conflicting goals (i.e. immigration rights advocates and Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement officials often must come to agreement about how to best intervene in 
situations involving potentially out of status immigrant groups)‖ as obstacles to overcome). 
142 Compare U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., HHS: What We Do, 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (―(HHS) is the United 
States government's principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and 
providing essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help 
themselves.‖), and Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human 
Servs., About Rescue & Restore: Campaign Overview, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/trafficking/ 
rescue_restore/index.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (―The intent of the Rescue & Restore 
campaign is to increase the number of identified trafficking victims and to help those 
victims receive the benefits and services needed to live safely in the [United States].‖), with 
U.S. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission, Securing Our 
Homeland, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan (last visited May 10, 2009) (―[The] 
Department of Homeland Security‘s overriding and urgent mission is to lead the unified 
national effort to secure the country and preserve our freedoms.‖). 
143  Notably, the 2008 TVPRA amendments to the TVPA vest increasing authority in 
the Secretary of HHS to screen illegal aliens to determine victim status and eligibility for 
benefits. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 tit. II, sec. 212, 122 Stat. at 5063 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)) (vesting 
―exclusive authority‖ in the Secretary of HHS ―to make interim eligibility determinations‖); 
id. tit. II, sec. 235, 122 Stat. at 5074–75 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1232) (vesting 
authority for the Secretary of HHS to make determinations regarding unaccompanied alien 
children). Because these provisions ―essentially distanc[e] law enforcement‖ from these 
unaccompanied minors, some conservative experts fear that an unlimited vesting of 
authority to HHS ―could turn every minor‘s case into victim advocacy, when law 
enforcement may have a legitimate role to play in some circumstances.‖ Aid Approved, 
WORLD, Dec. 27, 2008/Jan. 3, 2009, at 12.  
Removing law enforcement authorities—such as the DHS, FBI, or DOJ—from the 
victim identification process has serious national security implications. Publishing its 
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clearly define the roles of specific agencies. These challenges illuminate a 
significant void—a lack of leadership and direction from a central 
authority figure.144 
V. TIME TO RALLY THE TROOPS: THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
TO FINISH THE FIGHT 
―Whatever politics surround the trafficking issue, it is clear that the 
phenomenon will attract nations‘ attention and energy for years to 
come.‖145 Though efforts to fight modern-day slavery are growing in 
scope, sophistication, and momentum, many traffickers remain elusive, 
shielded by a larger ring of underground criminals.146 The generational 
nature of the war on trafficking means that abolitionists must dig into 
the trenches and settle in for the long battles ahead. A well-fought war 
requires a well-mapped strategy of attack—including specifically 
delineated battle plans and a timeline to achieve certain goals.147 
Looking ahead, others have recognized that a strategic framework is 
                                                                                                                  
stance in opposition to similar provisions proposed in an earlier version of the bill, the DOJ 
made it clear that ―[t]he Attorney General should be involved in any program that focuses 
on combating child trafficking at the border.‖ Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., 
Chairman of Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 11 (Nov. 9, 2007), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/dept-view-letter-hjc-on-hr3887.pdf. In critiquing 
the bill, the DOJ expressed its strong opposition to any ―language . . . that inappropriately 
remove[d] law enforcement from any initial determination of victim status or benefits 
eligibility.‖ Id. at 6.  
Further, in light of ―national security interests,‖ the DOJ argued that ―DHS need[ed] 
more flexibility to handle gang members, terrorists, repeat offenders, and state offenders.‖ 
Id. at 11. National security concerns are only amplified by suggested relationships between 
human trafficking and terrorism. See, e.g., Renee Sauerland, Human Trafficking: 
Application of Alternative Methodologies For Elimination as a Critical Component in the 
United States War on Terror 2 (2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Regent University) (on file 
with Regent University Library) (―It has been shown that organized crime organizations 
are directly associated with terrorist organizations, which use trafficking of humans as a 
source of income and increased ‗manpower‘ support.‖); TIP REPORT 2006, supra note 39, at 
17 (―In some parts of the world, traffickers are distorting traditional Islamic customs to 
facilitate human trafficking.‖). Just as victims‘ rights advocates may argue that DHS is ill 
equipped to identify and facilitate prompt protection of trafficking victims encountered at 
the border, others may argue that HHS is not trained to identify criminal or terrorist 
threats in unaccompanied minors discovered within the borders. See supra note 142. 
144  See infra note 149. 
145  DESTEFANO, supra note 11, at xxvii.  
146  See supra notes 17, 35, and 55.  
147  Though comprehensive, the TVPA and its amendments alone do not accomplish 
these objectives. Lingering questions beg answers from a central authority, such as: Should 
child sex trafficking be prioritized over other forms of trafficking, for example labor 
trafficking, and if so, to what extent? Which federal department or agency has the final say 
over which issues? Is there a hierarchy defining how departments and agencies should 
work together? How are the issues of prostitution and sex trafficking related? How broad 
should the definition of trafficking be, and what types of activities should it encompass? 
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essential to finish the fight.148 This Note proposes that our nation‘s 
Commander-in-Chief,149 along with his administration, should develop 
and implement this strategic framework, which can be accomplished by 
publication of an annual United States Trafficking in Persons Strategy 
called U.S. TIPS. Similar to the Department of State‘s annual TIP 
report, U.S. TIPS would provide a published, centralized, authoritative 
document that all departments and agencies can regard as a source of 
universal guidance and strategy.150 
U.S. TIPS could serve at least five specific functions to help 
implement an effective strategic framework: 1) define the parameters of 
human trafficking;151 2) delineate the roles of concerned departments, 
agencies, and NGOs;152 3) position future goals in an aspirational 
                                                 
148  See, e.g., THE ACTION GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FIGHTING HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD: TRANSITION REPORT FOR THE NEXT 
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION 7 (2008) [hereinafter ACTION GROUP TRANSITION REPORT], 
available at http://theactiongroup.org/issues/Action_Group_Transition_Memo_2008.pdf 
(―[T]he [United States] must ensure that its policies, laws, and implementing government 
agencies are properly coordinated in an integrated framework to combat human trafficking 
worldwide.‖); U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK COULD HELP ENHANCE THE 
INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY COMBAT TRAFFICKING CRIMES 38 
(2007) [hereinafter GAO FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d07915.pdf (recommending ―a strategic framework to coordinate [United States] efforts to 
investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons‖); Derek Ellerman, A Framework for 
Strategic Planning Against Trafficking in Persons (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.ellerman.info/ 
joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=29 (showing a strategic 
framework developed by Polaris Project).  
149  ―No single department or agency is capable of wielding the interagency authority 
necessary to bring together the full range of anti-trafficking actors and activities across the 
Executive Branch adequately.‖ ACTION GROUP TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 148, at 17. 
Accordingly, this Note agrees with the Action Group‘s recommendation that ―[t]he Office of 
the President needs to take an active and informed leadership role to improve interagency 
collaboration, provide oversight, and ensure accountability because of the broad and 
complex interagency jurisdictional nature of this issue.‖ Id. at 18; cf. GAO FRAMEWORK, 
supra note 148, at 38 (recommending that ―the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretaries of Labor, State, and other agency 
heads deemed appropriate, develop and implement a strategic framework‖).  
Despite legislative initiatives establishing the President‘s Interagency Task 
Force (PITF) and Senior Policy Operating Ground (SPOG), past performance 
has shown that relevant agencies all too often do not work well together absent 
direction and leadership from the White House. Instead they have frequently 
functioned as independent actors, failing to maximize the [United States] 
investment of resources in this issue and too often working at cross-purposes. 
ACTION GROUP TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 148, at 18. 
150  Unlike the broad-based TIP report, however, which assesses international anti-
trafficking measures on a nation-by-nation basis, the more localized U.S. TIPS would 
address internal anti-trafficking policies and directives within the United States, assessing 
both national and state-specific initiatives. 
151  See supra Part IV.A. 
152  See supra Part IV.C. 
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timeline;153 4) measure progress on a state-by-state and national basis 
and identify statutory weaknesses at both levels;154 and 5) provide a 
centrally recognized document to report synthesized updates of ongoing 
research results.155 U.S. TIPS would also be an ideal forum in which to 
publish, as appendices, a model protocol for victim identification156 as 
well as the DOJ‘s model state law.157 
Publication of U.S. TIPS would help address many of the problems 
identified in this Note by clarifying ambiguities, providing direction, 
mapping out both long-term and short-term objectives (effectively 
implementing a ―war strategy‖), and, ultimately, by rallying the troops 
under a common purpose by presenting a unified mission. In addition, it 
would serve as a point of reference from which to disseminate updated 
information and research, as a means from which to measure progress 
and identify weaknesses, and as a tool to help sharpen anti-trafficking 
legislation, victim identification protocols, and assistance methods. 
                                                 
153  This function would help quell some of the debate surrounding which ―tactic‖ or 
strategy the United States should adopt as it tackles the equation of human trafficking, 
presented supra Part IV.B (―SUPPLY + DEMAND = HUMAN TRAFFICKING‖).  
154  This comparative function would help evaluate states on an individual basis in a 
manner similar to the TIP report‘s method of reporting on progress of individual nation-
states. Importantly, it would serve as a motivational force to encourage states, by way of 
peer pressure, to implement and improve local anti-trafficking measures. 
155  Given the overwhelming amount of research being conducted and published on 
human trafficking—varying in both quantity and quality—the need for a centralized place 
of dissemination is paramount. See, e.g., OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS ON 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS FY02-07 (BY AGENCY) (2008), http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/ 
other/2008/109866.htm (providing a chart of government funded trafficking research 
projects in multiple countries, including the United States); Nat‘l Inst. of Justice, U.S. 
Dep‘t of Justice, Publications Related to Human Trafficking, http://nij.ncjrs.gov/ 
publications/Pub_Search.asp?category=99&searchtype=basic&location=top&PSID=25 (last 
visited May 10, 2009) (providing links to twenty-seven extensive research publications 
either published or sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (―NIJ‖)); see also ACTION 
GROUP TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 148, at 28 (suggesting that ―[m]eta-analysis could 
combine data sets from all agencies and make possible a deeper understanding of the 
incidence and trends of human trafficking, thus helping to improve intervention methods‖).  
156 HHS, the agency charged with issuing certification letters to victims of human 
trafficking who are eligible for the federal benefits outlined in the TVPA, provides useful 
resources in its Rescue & Restore Campaign Tool Kit. Admin. For Children & Families, 
U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., Rescue & Restore Campaign Tool Kits, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/trafficking/campaign_kits/index.html (last visited May 10, 2009). At 
the same time, however, independent organizations are also developing similar resources. 
Notably, one group, funded by a federal grant from the DOJ, has extensively researched 
best practices for effective questions during screening processes in New York City and 
created a screening tool and accompanying toolkit for identifying potential victims. 
MEASURING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 36. As research continues to enhance the 
screening process and increase its effectiveness in identifying victims, the need for a 
centralized location to approve and publish a uniform model protocol increases. 
157  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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U.S. TIPS is a tangible solution that would help our current 
President pick up the fight where the previous administration left off158 
and would help ensure that the 3-P prerogative is not only progressing 
but achieving an appropriate measure of balance between its 
independent goals of prevention, protection, and prosecution.159 
CONCLUSION 
The war on human trafficking involves battles on many fronts,160 
fought on many different fields.161 The 2003, 2005, and 2008 TVPRAs 
reflect a commendable succession of increasing victories on the 
legislative battlefield, significantly enhancing the federal government‘s 
ability to prosecute traffickers and protect victims. While tracking those 
victories, this Note endeavored to illustrate how America‘s war on 
trafficking still suffers from a critical gap in ―war strategy,‖ and suggests 
that the new presidential administration can organize the future fight by 
practical implementation of a strategic framework in the form of an 
annually published U.S. TIPS.  
Since the Clinton Administration‘s 1998 ―declaration of war‖ 
against human trafficking, progress over the past decade should not be 
downplayed or diminished, but acknowledged and celebrated. President 
Bush‘s successive administration did much to fund and prioritize the 
fight against human trafficking. Congress, as emphasized, has 
contributed to significant legislative victories. In the private sector, 
passionate abolitionists have organized to spread awareness of the 
cause, provide vital victim services, improve victim identification 
procedures, develop better research methods, organize lobbying efforts, 
and contribute to scholarship. The efforts of these private individuals, 
often in the form of NGOs, have tremendously advanced the fight 
against trafficking in America. 
Despite these advancements, the war rages on. Many battles are yet 
to be won, many traffickers yet to be discovered and prosecuted, and 
many victims yet to be rescued and released from bondage. Even with an 
army of organizations, agencies, and individuals ready to pick up the 
fight, the war will suffer absent clear direction and a united purpose. 
                                                 
158  See ACTION GROUP TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 148, at 5 (explaining how 
―the Clinton Administration‘s policies established a foundation for combating human 
trafficking‖ and the George W. Bush Administration ―supported and significantly expanded 
America‘s commitment to end human trafficking,‖ particularly by way of funding); supra 
Part I.  
159  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
160  For example, legal, social, political, and individual. 
161  The war on trafficking is fought from local street corners to state legislatures, 
from national halls of Congress to international conventions.  
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The President‘s leadership in developing a cohesive, comprehensive, and 
authoritative strategy is necessary to finish the fight for freedom. 
Valerie S. Payne 
 
